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BY T. J. MCCORMACK.
WITH the death of Friedrich Max Miiller, on October 28th of
this year, one of the most notable personages of the aca-
demic world passed from the stage of history. We say "stage"
advisedly, for Max Miiller's career was in more senses than one
histrionic, in the best sense of that word, and there was hardly a
moment of his life that he did not stand prominently and conspic-
uously before the public notice. To the unlearned world at large,
he was the personification of philological scholarship,—a scholar-
ship which he knew how to render accessible to his public in inimit-
ably simple and charming style. There was no domain of philoso-
phy, mythology, or religion, that he left untouched or unmodified
by his comprehensive researches, and the Science of Language,
which is the greatest scholastic glory of the German nation, would
appear, judging from his books alone, to have received in him its
final incarnation and Messianic fulfilment. There was no national
or international dispute of modern times, ever so remotely con-
nected with philological questions, but his ready pen was seen
swinging in the thick of the combat, and his Sanskrit roots made
to bear the burden of a people's destiny. He was the recipient of
more academic honors, orders, titles, royal and imperial favors,
perhaps, than any other scholar since Humboldt, and he bore the
greatness that was thrust upon him with the grace and dignit}' of
a born aristocrat. Many were the pummellings he received from
the hands of his less favored but more plodding colleagues ; yet
their buffets of ink but served to throw his Titanic figure into
greater relief, and to afford him an opportunity by his delicate,
insidious irony to endear himself still more to his beloved public.
Apart from his great and sound contributions to the cause of learn-
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ing and thought, which none will deny, Max Miiller's indisputably
greatest service was to have made knowledge agreeable,— nay,
even fashionable,—and his proudest boast was that when deliver-
ing his lectures on the Science of Language at the Royal Institu-
tion, Albemarle street was thronged with the crested carriages of
the great, and that not only "the keen dark eyes of Faraday,"
"the massive face of the Bishop of St. David's," but even the
countenances of royalty, shone out upon him from his audiences.
Friedrich Maximilian Miiller was born in Dessau, Germany,
on December 6, 1823. He was the son of the well-known German
poet Wilhelm Miiller, the great-grandson of Basedow, the reformer
of national education in all Germany, and the grandson of a
Prime Minister to the Duke of Anhalt-Dessau. His environment
was thus, from the start, one of the highest culture, and he re-
ceived through its advantages a thorough education, especially in
music, in which he was very proficient. At Leipsic, where he at-
tended the famous Nicolai School, and afterwards the University,
he lived in the musical house of Professor Carus, father of Prof.
V. Carus, the translator of Darwin, where he gained the friendship
of Mendelssohn, Liszt, David, Kalliwoda, Hiller, and Clara Schu-
mann. Here, and afterwards at Berlin, Paris, and London, he made
the acquaintance of the great notabilities of the day, among whom
were numbered Riickert, Humboldt, Burnouf, Froude, Ruskin,
Carlyle, Faraday, Grote, Darwin, Emerson, Lowell, and Holmes.
It was the Orientalist Burnouf that encouraged him to pub-
lish the first edition of the Rig-Veda,—a labor which brought him
to England in 1846 and which he completed twenty five years
afterwards, having laid in the meantime the foundation of his
career and become a fellow of Oxford, an incumbent of two pro-
fessorships, and curator of the Oriental Works of the Bodleian
Library. His edition of the Rig Veda, his History of Ancient San-
skrit Literature, and his Six Systems of Indian Philosophy are the
works on which his technical reputation stands. Of that enormous
and meritorious undertaking, the translation of the Sacred Books of
the East (49 vols.), he was the editor, but personally translated only
the Upanishads, the Vedic Hyrnns, the Dhammapada and some of the
Mahayana texts. His numerous other writings, on the Science 0/
Language (2 volumes, 1861-1864), the Science of Thought (2 vol-
umes, 1887), the Science of Religion (6 volumes, Hibbert and Gifford
Lectures, 1870-1892), important as they are, were rather popular
and expository in their nature and devoted to the presentation of
his own personal philosophy, which to the very end of his life he
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propagated and defended with uncommon ardor and success. In
all these works we read Max Muller the philosopher and theorist,
not Max Muller the philologist. In fact, he expressly disclaimed
being a philologist in the pure technical sense, and boldly hailed
himself as the protagonist of a new science,— the Science of Lan-
guage, which was to him but a means to an end, "a telescope to
watch the heavenly movements of our thoughts, a microscope to
discover the primary cells of our concepts." And whatever im-
press he left upon the thought of his time, will have come from
these works. In addition to this, he was the apostle and guide
of the great public in the domain of linguistic science, and he ranks
with Huxley and Tyndall as a shaper of popular scientific thought.
Two of his little books. Three Introductory Lectures on the Science
of Thought and Three Lectures on the Science of Language, together
with the essay Persona, were published in the first numbers of The
Open Coitrt and afterwards appeared in book form. These books
sum up in elegant and terse manner his philosophy, and we shall
devote a few words to them after we have dwelt more at length on
his interesting personality.
PERSONAL REMINISCENCES.
Max Miiller's career as a scholar and philosopher was indis-
solubly connected with his career as a man, and his thought and
his controversies in the latter half of his life were all colored by
his dominant ambitions. In his delightful reminiscences, entitled
Auld Lang Syne-, published two years before his death (New York,
Scribner's), Professor Muller has himself told many stories which
are illustrative of the high estimation in which he was held by the
world. One circles about the import of a witty letter of Darwin's,
whom he had combated on the ground that language formed an
inseparable barrier between brute and man. Romanes regarded
the letter as an instance of Darwin's "extraordinary humility."
Professor Muller saw in it more of humor than humility, and mod-
estly deprecates the notion that he should ever have been thought
guilty of considering it as a trophy. We think that neither Romanes
nor Muller has read the letter aright. The following is the text:
Down, I^eckenham, Kent, 15th Oct., 1875.
My Dear Sir ;
—
I am greatly obliged to you for so kindly sending me your essay, which I am
sure will interest me much. With respect to our differences, though some of your
remarks have been rather stinging, they have all been made so gracefully, I declare
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that I am like the man in the story who boasted that he had been soundly horse-
whipped by a Duke.
Pray believe me, yours very sincerely,
Charles Darwin.
In his Recollections of Royalty, he tells of an amusing incident
that nearly prevented his compliance with an invitation to dine
with the King of Prussia at Potsdam, together with Humboldt.
" But a curious intermezzo happened. While I was quietly sitting in my room
with my mother, a young lieutenant of police entered, and began to ask a number
of extremely silly questions—why I had come to Berlin, when I meant to return
to England, what had kept me so long in Berlin, etc. After I had fully explained
to him that I was collecting Sanskrit MSS. at the Royal Library, he became more
peremptory, and informed me that the police authorities thought that a fortnight
must be amply sufficient for that purpose (how I wished that it had been so!), and
that they requested me to leave Berlin within twenty-four hours. I produced my
passport, perfectly en regie ; I explained that I wanted but another week to finish
my work. It was all of no avail, I was told that I must leave in twenty-four hours.
I then collected my thoughts, and said very quietly to the young lieutenant, 'Please
to tell the police authorities that I shall, of course, obey orders, and leave Berlin
at once, but that I must request them to inform His Majesty the King that I shall
not be able to dine with him to-night at Potsdam.' The poor young man thought
I was laughing at him, but when he saw that I was in earnest he looked thunder-
struck, bowed, and went away. ... It was not long, however, before another police
official appeared, an elderly gentleman of pleasant manners, who explained to me
how sorry he was that the young lieutenant of police should have made so foolish
a mistake. He begged me entirely to forget what had happened, as it would seri-
ously injure the young lieutenant's prospects if I lodged a complaint against him.
I promised to forget, and, at all events, not to refer to what had happened in the
Royal presence."
The young professor returned from Sans Souci in the carriage
with Humboldt :
"I could not resist telling him [Humboldt] in strict confidence my little ad-
venture with the police lieutenant, and he was highly amused. I hope he did not
tell the King; anyhow, no names were mentioned."
He was on intimate terms also with the Crown Prince Fred-
erick. He writes of their meeting at Ems, in 1871 :
" At Ems the Prince was the popular hero of the day, and wherever he showed
himself he was enthusiastically greeted by the people. He sent me word that he
wished to see me. When I arrived, the antechambers were crowded with High-
nesses, Excellencies, Generals, all covered with stars and ribands. I gave my card
to an A. D. C. as simple Max Miiller, and was told that I must wait, but I soon
saw there was not the slightest chance of my having an audience that morning. I
had no uniform, no order, no title. From time to time an officer called the name
of Prince So-and-So, Count So-and-So, and people became very impatient. Sud-
denly the Prince himself opened the door, and called out in a loud voice, 'Maxi-
milian, Maximilian, kommen Sie herein ! ' There was consternation in the crowd
as I walked through, but I had a most pleasant half-hour with the Prince."
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In 1888, Max Miiller and the Crown Prince were again at
Ems, but their meeting on this occasion was frustrated :
" The Crown Prince had sent me word that he wished to see me once more ; but
his surroundings evidently thought that I had been favoured quite enough, and our
meeting again was cleverly prevented. No doubt princes must be protected against
intruders, but should they be thwarted in their own wishes ?"
Not to mention his having won sixpence from the Prince of
Wales at whist, Professor Miiller was the recipient of many other
distinguished favors from the English Royal family, notably from
Prince Leopold, who during his stay at Oxford always reserved
for the great philologist some of his ancient and rare Johannis-
berger, from the famous crue of Prince Metternich.
" Once more the Prince was most kind to me under most trying circumstances.
I was to dine at Windsor, and when I arrived my portmanteau was lost. I tele-
graphed and telegraphed, and at last the po tmanteau was found at Oxford station,
but there was no train to arrive at Windsor I efore 8 30. Prince Leopold, who was
staying at Windsor, and to whom I went in my distress, took the matter in a most
serious spirit. I thought I might send an excuse to say that I had had an accident
and could not appear at table; but he said : 'No, that is impossible. If the Queen
asks you to dinner, you must be there.' He then sent round all the castle to fit me
out. Everybody seemed to have contributed some article of clothing,—coat, waist-
coat, tie, shorts, shoes and buckles. I looked a perfect guy, and I declared that I
could not possibly appear before the Queen m that attire. I was actually penning
a note when the 8 30 train arrived, and with it my luggage, which I tore open,
dressed in a few minutes, and appeared at dinner as if nothing had happened.
"Fortunately the Queen, who had been paying a visit, came in very late.
Whether she had heard of my misfortunes, I do not know. But I was very much
impressed when I saw how, with all the devotion that the Prince felt for his mother,
there was this feeling of respect, nay, almost of awe, that made it seem impossible
to tell his mother that I was prevented by an accident from obeying her command
and appearing at dinner."
PHILOSOPHICAL.
To Max Miiller the problem of the origin of language was the
problem of the origin of thought, and in the researches of the Sci-
ence of Language were contained for him in nuce the solutions of
the Science of Thought. Language, for him, was petrified reason,
the geological record of human thought, as well as its living ve-
hicle. He admires above all its simplicity: ^
"If we have, say, eight hundred material or predicative roots and a small
number of demonstrative elements given us, then, roughly speaking, the riddle of
language is solved. We know what language is, what it is made of, and we are
thus enabled to admire, not so much its complexity as its translucent simplicity.'
But whence these roots? Here is the delicate question.
1 The following quotations are from Max Miiller's Three Introiluetory Lectures on the Science
of Thought, piiblifhed by the Open Court Pub. Co.
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"There are three things that have to be explained in roots, such as we find
them :
1. Their being intelligible^, not only to the speaker but to all who listen to him ;
2. Their having a definite body of consonants and vowels
;
3. Their expressing general concepts."
In the explanation of these three characteristics, the solution
of the problem lies. The sounds of nature, even those emitted by
man as a part of nature, are in themselves unmeaning ; they are
physical phenomena merely. And this is also true of the emotional
interjections of rational human beings: they are mere puffs of
wind, individual in their significance, and standing on the same
level with the botv-ivo7i' of the dog.
" It was Professor Noire who first pointed out that roots, in order to be intelli-
gible to others, must have been from the very first social sounds.—sounds uttered
by several people together. They must have been what he calls the clamor con-
comitans, uttered almost involuntarily by a whole gang engaged in a common
work. Such sounds are uttered even at present by sailors rowing together, by
peasants digging together, by women spinning or sewing together. They are
uttered and they are understood. And not only would this clamor concomiians be
understood by all the members of a community, but on account of its frequent
repetition it would soon assume a more definite form than belongs to the shouts of
individuals, which constantly vary, according to circumstances and individual ten-
dencies."
But the most difficult problem still remains. How did those
sounds become signs, not simply of emotions, but of concepts?
For all roots are expressive of concepts ; our intellectual life is all
conceptual. How was the first concept formed?
" That is the question which the Science of Thought has to solve. At present
we simply take a number of sensuous intuitions, and after descrying something
which they share in common, we assign a name to it, and thus get a concept. For
instance, seeing the same color in coal, ink, and in a negro, we form the concept
of black ; or seeing white in milk, snow, and chalk, we form the concept of white.
In some cases a concept is a mere shadow of a number of percepts, as when we
speak of oaks, beeches, and firs, as trees. But suppose we had no such names as
black, and white, and tree, where would our concept be ?
"We are speaking, however, of a period in the growth of the human mind
when there existed as yet neither names nor concepts, and the question which we
have to answer is, how the roots which we have discovered as the elements of lan-
guage came to have a conceptual meaning. Now the fact is, the majority of roots
express acts, and mostly acts which men in a primitive state of society are called
upon to perform ; I mean acts such as digging, plaiting, weaving, striking, throw-
ing, binding, etc. All of these are acts of which those who perform them are ipso
facto conscious ; and as most of these acts were continuous or constantly repeated,
we see in the consciousness of these repeated acts the first glimmer of conceptual
thought, the first attempt to comprehend many things as one. Without any effort
of their own the earliest framers of language found the consciousness of their own
repeated acts raised into conceptual consciousness, while the sounds by which
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these acts were accompanied became spontaneously what we now call conceptual
roots in every language."
These results quite agree with the psychological conclusions
of Professor Mach (see The Open Court for June of this year, p.
348, "The Concept"), who regards concepts as bundles of direc-
tions for performing definite activities, and conceptual names and
sounds as the keys that unlock the impulses to these activities : the
whole resting on the conscious repetition of actions.
Professor Noir^ emphasises another feature of the process.
He thinks that "true conceptual consciousness begins only from
the time when men became conscious of results, of facts, and not
only of acts. The mere consciousness of the acts of digging, strik-
ing, binding, does not satisfy him. Only when men perceive the
results of their acts—for instance, in the hole dug, in the tree
struck down, in the reeds tied together as a mat—did they, accord-
ing to him, arrive at conceptual thought in language."
Such, then, is the origin of the one hundred and twenty con-
cepts to which the eight hundred roots of the Indo-European lan-
guages are reducible. "These one hundred and twenty concepts
are the rivers that feed the whole ocean of thought and speech.
There is no thought that passes through our mind, or that has
passed through the minds of the greatest poets and prophets of
old, that cannot directly or indirectly be derived from one of these
fundamental concepts."
And these thoughts, "the whole of our intellect, all the tricks
of the wizard in our brain, consist in nothing but addition and sub-
traction," in nothing but combination and separation. But what
is it that is combined and separated?
We shall forego the metaphysical discussion of the possibility
of sensation and experience which Max Miiller interpolates at this
stage of the development of his theory, and shall jump immediately
to the point at issue,— his enunciation of his celebrated doctrine of
the identity of language and thought. He says :
"How aethereal vibrations produce in us consciousness of something, how
neurosis becomes ssthesis, we do not know and never shall know. But having the
sensations of light or darkness within us, what do we know of any cause of dark-
ness or any cause of light ? Nothing. We simply suffer darkness, or enjoy light,
but what makes us suffer and what makes us rejoice, we do not know,
—
till zee can
express it.
"And how do we express it ? We may try what we like, we can express it in
language only. We may feel dark, but till we have a name for dark and are able
to distinguish darkness as what is not light, or light as what is not darkness, we
are not in a state of knowledge, we are only in a state of passive stupor.
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"We often imagine that we can possess and retain, even without language,
certain pictures or phantasmata ; that, for instance, when lightning has passed be-
fore our eyes, the impression remains for some time actually visible, then vanishes
more and more, when we shut our eyes, but can be called back by the memory,
whenever we please. Yes, we can call it back, but not till we can call, that is, till
we can name it. In all our mental acts, even in that of mere memory, we must be
able to give an account to ourselves of what we do, and how can we do that except
in language? Even in a dream we do not know what we see, except we name it,
that is, make it knowable to ourselves. Everything else passes by and vanishes
unheeded. We either are simply suffering, and in that case we require no language,
or we act and react, and in that case we can react on what is given us, by language
only. This is really a matter of fact and not of argument. Let any one try the
experiment, and he will see that we can as little think without words as we can
breathe without lungs."
By words, however, Max Miiller means signs. "All I maintain
is, that thought cannot exist without signs, and that our most im-
portant signs are words."
" How is it, I have been asked, that people go through the most complicated
combinations while playing chess and all this without uttering a single word ? Does
not that show that thought is possible without words, and, as it were, by mere in-
tuition ? It may seem so, if we imagine that speech must always be audible, but
we have only to watch ourselves while writing a letter, that is, while speaking to a
friend, in order to see that a loud voice is not essential to speech. Besides, by long
usage speech has become so abbreviated that, as with mathemathetical formulas,
one sign or letter may comprehend long trains of reasoning. And how can we im-
agine that we could play chess without language, however silent, however abbrevi-
ated, however algebraic ? What are king, queen, bishops, knights, castles, and
pawns, if not names ? What are the squares on the chessboard to us, unless they
had been conceived and named as being square and neither round nor oblong ?
" I do not say, however, that king and queen and bishops are mere f/a»ies.
" There is no such a thing as a mere name. A name is nothing if it is not a
nomen, that is, what is known, or that by which we know. Nometi was originally
gnome^i, from giiosco to know, and was almost the same word as notio, a notion.
A mere name is therefore self-contradictory. It means a name which is not a
name; but something quite different, namely, a sound, a /lains I'ocis. We do not
call an empty egg-shell a mere egg, nor a corpse a mere man ; then why should
we call a name without its true meaning, a mere name ?
"But if there is no such thing as a mere name, neither is there such a thing
as a mere thought or a mere concept. The two are one and inseparable. We may
distinguish them as we distinguish the obverse from the reverse of a coin ; but to
try to separate them would be like trying to separate the convex from the concave
surface of a lens. We think in names and in names only."
We are now in a position to grasp his view in its full import.
The entire fabric of the mind is identical with the fabric of human
speech, and the whole history of philosophy reveals itself but as
the natural growth of language.
"Reason ... is language, not simply as we now hear it and use it, but as
has been slowly elaborated by man through all the ages of his existence on earth-
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Reason is the growth of centuries, it is the work of man, and at the same time an
instrument brought to higher and higher perfection by the leading thinkers and
speakers of the world. No reaso7i zuithoiit lajignage, no language zvitJioul
reason. Try to reckon without numbers, whether spoken, written, or otherwise
marked, and if you succeed in that, I shall admit that it is possible to reason or
reckon without words, and that there is in us such a thing, or such a power or fac-
ulty, as reason, apart from words."
Such, in epitome, is Max Miiller's famous doctrine of the Iden-
tity of Language and Thought,—a docrine in which he is supported
by a long line of illustrious predecessors.^ It is not our purpose
in this place to offer any criticism of its general tenability. This
has been done, in part, by the editor of this magazine in two essays
in The Motiist, to which readers desirous of more details are re-
ferred. ^ It merely remains for us to remark that Max Miiller's
theory, which it is sometimes difficult to grasp precisely in its
critical points, is now held, even by those who admit the intrinsic
truth of his assertions, only with great modification. His definition
of thought is upon the whole arbitrary and made pro domo. The
barrier between man and animal is not so impassable as he liked
to imagine, and the tendency of recent thought in comparative
psychology has swerved from his position. But the beauty of style,
the wealth and breadth of learning, the controversial skill with which
he advocated his doctrine are undeniable, and the controversies to
which his zealous championing of his cause led have advanced the
cause of truth immeasurably. And this, he avers in an impersonal
moment, is his whole concern :
" You say I shall never live to see it admitted that man cannot reason without
words. This does not discourage me. Through the whole of my life I have cared
for truth, not for success. And truth is not our own. We may seek truth, serve
truth, love truth ; but truth takes care of herself, and she inspires her true lovers
with the same feeling of perfect trust. Those who cannot believe in themselves,
unless they are believed in by others, have never known what truth is. Those who
have found truth, know best how little it is their work, and how small the merit
which they can claim for themselves. They were blind before, and now they can
see That is all."
And again :^
"Scholars come and go and are forgotten, but the road which they have
opened remains, other scholars follow in their footsteps, and though some of them
retrace their steps, on the whole there is progress. This conviction is our best re-
svard, and gives us that real joy in our work which merely personal motives can
never supply."
1 See the article " My Predecessors " in his Three Lectures on the Science of Language. Chi-
cago : The Open Court Publishing Co.
2 " The Continuity of Evohition," The Monist, Vol, II., p. 70 ; " Prof. F. Max Miiller's Theory
of the Self," The Monist. Vol. VIII., p. 123.
''Contributions to the Science of Mythology, Vol. I., p. viii.
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The cause of true religion also is under great obligation to the
labors of Prof. Max Miiller. The very spirit of his motives in pub-
lishing translations of ihe gxedit Sacred Books of ihe East can have
been productive only of good.
"I had a secret hope that by such a publication of the Sacred Books of all
religions that were in possession of books of canonical authority, some very old
prejudices might be removed, and the truth of St. Augustine's words might be con-
firmed, that there is no religion without some truth in it, nay, that the ancients,
too, were in possession of some Christian truths. . . . We may well hope that a
study of the Sacred Books of the East may produce a kindlier feeling on the part
of many people, and more particularly of missionaries, towards those who are
called heathen, or even children of Satan, though they have long, though ignor-
antly, worshipped the God who is to be declared unto them ; and that a study of
other religions, if based on really trustworthy documents, shall enable many people
to understand and appreciate their own religion more truly and more fairly. Just
as a comparative study of languages has thrown an entirely new light on the nature
and historical growth of our own language, a comparative study of religions also, I
hoped, would enable us to gain a truer insight into the peculiar character of Chris-
tianity, by seeing both what it shares in common with other religions, and what
distinguishes it from all its peers."
And he lived to see his hopes realised by the marvellous trans-
formations of the religious attitude wrought by the Parliament of
Religions of our World's Fair.
As to his personal belief, which is not easy to grasp in its pre-
cise details in his works, ^ we may say generally that Professor Max
Miiller was a Vedantist. He was a believer in the Brahman doc-
trine of the atman, or soul-in-itself, the monad soul; he believed
in a "thinker of thoughts," a "doer of deeds," a Self within the
person, which was the carrier of his personality, and a Self with-
out, which was the carrier of the world, "God, the highest Self";
and these two Selves are ultimately the same Self : Tat tvatn asi,
That art thou, as the Brahman said.
These views of his have received full discussion in the article
of Dr. Carus before referred to.^ How deeply they entered his be-
ing and with what little modification they might have been trans-
formed into the opposing theory of modern psychology, is appar-
ent from the following beautiful passage quoted from Persona (see
Vol. I. of The Open Court, pp. 505 and 543 )
:
"We are told that what distinguishes us from all other living beings is that
we are personal beings. We are persons, responsible persons, and our very being,
our life and immortality, are represented as depending on our personality. But if
1 Compare, for example, the remark of the Pferdebiirla, in the delightful essay of that name
in the D-utsche Rundschau for 1897: " Max, du bist vielleicht auch noch ein Gottesfabler. . . .
Max. ein ganz Freier bist du immer noch nicht."
2 The Monist, Vol. VIIL. p. 123.
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we ask what this personality means, and why we are called persoiice, the answers
are very ambiguous. Does our personality consist in our being English or German,
in our being young or old, male or female, wise or foolish ? And if not, what re-
mains when all these distinctions vanish ? Is there a higher Ego of which our hu-
man ego is but the shadow ? From most philosophers we get but uncertain and
evasive answers to these questions, and perhaps even here, in the darkest passages
of psychological and metaphysical inquiry, a true knowledge of language may
prove our best guide.
'
' Let us remember that fci-soiia had two meanings, that it meant originally a
mask, but that it soon came to be used as the name of the wearer of the mask.
Knowing how many ambiguities of thought arose from this, we have a right to ask:
Does our personality consist in the persona we are wearing, in our body, our
senses, our language and our reason, our thoughts, or does our true personality lie
somewhere else? It may be that at times we so forget ourselves, our true Self, as
to imagine that we are Romeo and Juliet, King Lear, or Prince Hamlet. Nor can
we doubt that we are responsible each for his own dratnatis persona, that we are
hissed or applauded, punished or rewarded, according as we act the part allotted
to us in this earthly drama, badly or well. But the time comes when we awake,
when we feel that not only our flesh and our blood, but all that we have been able
to feel, to think and to say, was outside our true self; that we were witnesses, not
actors; and that before we can go home, we must take off our masks, standing like
strangers on a strange stage, and wondering how for so long a time we did not per-
ceive even within ourselves the simple distinction between pcrso>/a and pcrso?ia
between the mask and the wearer.
"There is a Sanskrit verse which an Indian friend of mine, a famous Minister
of State, sent me when retiring from the world to spend his last years in contem-
plation of the highest problems:
' I am not this body, not the senses, nor this perishable, fickle mind, not
even the understanding ; I am not indeed this breath ; how should I be this
entirely dull matter? I do not desire, no, not a wife, far less houses, sons,
friends, land, and wealth. I am the witness only, the perceiving inner self,
the support of the whole world, and blessed.' "
* *
And now the great philologist himself has passed away; his
Self also has been merged in the All-Self, creature in creator. The
fulness and purport of his life are such as have been granted to
few; his mission has been fulfilled to the utmost; and it was with
this consciousness that he departed. As Tacitus said of Agricola,
"Let us dwell upon and make our own the history and the pic-
ture, not of his person, but of his mind. . . . For all of him that
we follow with wonder and love remains and will remain forever
in the minds of men, through the endless flow of ages, as a portion
of the past."
